Aldina Journal of Islamic Studies
Vol. 01, No. 01 (2026)
https://journal.dinamedia.org/index.php/aldina

From Piety to Policy: How the State Rebrands Nationalism Through Religious Moderation

Mochammad Yoga Sundawa | Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Nurul Islam, Mojokerto | Indonesia
Selina Rahmawati Siswoyo | Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Nurul Islam, Mojokerto | Indonesia
Wilda Qonita | Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Nurul Islam, Mojokerto | Indonesia
Setiawan Budi | Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Nurul Islam, Mojokerto | Indonesia
*Correspondence: yogsun666@gmail.com

Abstract

At the Religious Moderation Action Launching Night organized by the Ministry of Religious Affairs on September 22, 2021, Cinta Laura gave a commencement address. As a young entertainer raised with Western educational values, her participation carries meaningful implications regarding the intended audience and objectives of the religious moderation initiative. Using critical discourse analysis methodology, this article investigates religious moderation as a form of state hegemonic policy. Data sources include scholarly works, articles, commentaries, and media reports from both print and digital platforms addressing religious moderation concepts and frameworks, particularly from 2020 onward. The central questions explored are: How has the religious moderation policy been formulated in the current context? What objectives does this policy serve? The article contends that religious moderation is being advanced by the state as a mechanism to reinforce new nationalist legitimacy. The policy's goal is to nationalize religious perspectives, thereby shaping public understanding of the religion-state relationship. This is achieved partly through measures that counter religious intolerance narratives, with special emphasis on educational settings. Furthermore, the state advocates for socio-cultural values deemed advantageous for preserving state stability. The article's key critical insight is that while religious moderation policies have enabled the state to reduce the political consequences of intolerance, the implementation remains largely formalistic and ceremonial in nature.

Keywords: New-Nationalism, Moderation, Stability, State Hegemony.

Received: February 13, 2026 | Revised: March 11, 2026 | Accepted: March 13, 2026

INTRODUCTION

At the 2018 High-Level Consultation of World Muslim Scholars on Wasatiyyat Islam (HLC-WMS), convened at Bogor's Presidential Palace on May 1st, President Joko Widodo declared Indonesia's dedication to establishing a global center for wasatiyyat Islam. The president expressed belief that this moderate Islamic approach could demonstrate Islam's merciful nature to humanity. Widodo highlighted Indonesia's track record with religious pluralism while asserting that Indonesian democracy aligns with wasatiyyah Islamic principles (Humas, 2018). Yet beyond characterizing Islam as a universal blessing (rahmatan lil'alamin), Widodo left the precise meaning of wasatiyyah Islam undefined.

The summit produced the 'Bogor Message,' articulating seven core wasatiyyah values: tawassut (maintaining the righteous path), I'tidal (proportionate and just conduct with accountability), tasamuh (acknowledging and honoring diversity across life's dimensions), shura (consensus-building through consultative problem-solving), islah (pursuing reformative actions benefiting collective welfare), qudwah (championing virtuous initiatives and leadership toward prosperity), and muwathonah (emphasizing national identity and civic responsibility) (Kumparan, 2024).

This gathering signaled that wasatiyyah concepts had reached Indonesia's highest governmental levels, with the state now championing this movement under the alternative label "religious moderation." Luqman Hakim Saefuddin, Religious Affairs Minister from 2014-2019, played a leading role in promoting religious moderation. The initiative gained official status as state policy, incorporated into the 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) via Presidential Regulation number 18 of 2020 (Kemenkum, 2023), with the Ministry of Religious Affairs spearheading implementation (Kemenag, 2023). President Jokowi further reinforced this agenda through Presidential Regulation number 58 of 2023 (BPK, 2023).

State authorities, however, offer varying interpretations of religious moderation, creating conceptual confusion that obscures clear objectives. The official framework identifies four metrics: national allegiance, tolerance, rejection of violence, and cultural accommodation (Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kemenag RI, 2019). This framework addresses the balance in religious observance that eschews extremism while fostering mutual understanding and tolerance. The multidimensional nature of religious moderation has generated numerous scholarly interpretations from academics and religious organizations (Ramdhani et al., n.d.).

For example, Yahya Cholil Staquf, Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board's General Chairman, described religious moderation during his address at Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau State Islamic University as dedication to reconciling differences and cultivating tolerance through meaningful dialogue (Jasnida, 2021). Haedar Nasir, Muhammadiyah Central Board Chairman, characterized wasatiyyah Islam as combining courage with prudence, pursued through rational-scientific and spiritual pathways using interconnected bayani, burhani, and irfani approaches, positioning Muhammadiyah as exemplifying this balanced path (Nurfatoni, 2021). Ali Ramdhani, Ministry of Religious Affairs Director General for Islamic Higher Education, outlined nine components: tawassuth (moderation), i'tidal (righteousness), tasamuh (tolerance), shura (consultation), ishlah (reformation), la 'unf (nonviolence), and i'tibar al-'urf (cultural accommodation) (Ramdhani et al., n.d.).

These varying perspectives reveal that religious moderation's definition remains fluid, contested, and contentious, rendering movement objectives increasingly diffuse and unmeasurable. Nonetheless, the underlying theme centers on reinforcing state recognition through religious moderation principles. Yahya Tsaquf stressed religious moderation's role in serving Indonesia's collective interests. Haedar Nasir connected Muhammadiyah's moderate approach to pandemic response strategies. Ali Ramdhani outlined pathways to achieving the nine values through civic interaction, social order maintenance, and citizenship practices including acceptance of national consensus and homeland defense.

Research examining Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī's conception of religious moderation and its contemporary relevance, particularly for Southeast Asia, explores his attempt to balance political stability with religious authority while advocating flexible leadership under non-ideal conditions. However, al-Juwaynī's framework doesn't explicitly address religious moderation's political construction or its influence on Indonesia's emerging nationalism (Widigdo & Pawi, 2023).

Most scholarship emphasizes religious moderation's benefits and positive behavioral impacts across social, cultural, political, educational, and economic domains (Ismail, n.d.), sometimes reducing the movement to subjective theological promotion and doctrinal advocacy (Alwi, 2021). Critical examination of religious moderation's concept and potential limitations remains essential for maintaining scholarly objectivity and balance.

Social science research, for instance, assesses Indonesian Muslims' understanding and perspectives on religious moderation, then emphasizes its importance for interfaith harmony and tolerance while positioning it as antithetical to radicalism and extremism (Kusmidi, 2023; Jura, 2021). Cultural scholarship explores connections between culture and indigenous values (Massoweang, 2024), national fiqh (Rasyid et al., 2022; Ridha, 2023; Syafieh & Anzhaikan, 2022), and religious leaders' contributions to advancing religious moderation (Djainuddin, 2022; Faisal et al., 2022; Irham et al., 2021).

Political analyses typically frame religious moderation through state-religion dynamics in Indonesia (Rismawati et al., 2021), addressing freedom of religion and belief (FoRB) challenges, Muslim nations' political adaptation to moderation discourse, and comparative policy epistemologies between countries like Indonesia and Australia (Yunus & Hanafiah, 2020). Scholars trace religious moderation's historical foundations in Indonesian society (Hakim et al., 2023). Educational research examines how academic institutions either advance (Inayatillah, 2021; Azizah et al., n.d.) or obstruct religious moderation concepts among learners (Murtadlo, 2024). Financial literacy emerges as another vehicle for promoting religious moderation (Bahri et al., 2022).

This article's distinctive contribution lies in demonstrating how state hegemony achieves religious moderation, fostering a novel nationalism that ultimately consolidates governmental political legitimacy. This reimagined nationalism employs religiously-charged patriotic rhetoric to marginalize particular religious communities deemed threatening to political stability. The state no longer confronts colonialism or external dangers but instead identifies inflexible and exclusionary religious teachings as hazards to Indonesia's national unity. Ultimately, these measures serve to strengthen pragmatic political support.

METHOD

This study utilizes discourse analysis (specifically content analysis) within a qualitative framework. Data are drawn from secondary sources, including books, scholarly articles, expert opinions, and media coverage from both printed and digital outlets that address religious moderation concepts and thinking, particularly from 2020 onward. This methodological approach aims to demonstrate how religious moderation as textual material functions as a

social phenomenon that the government communicates and to which the public reacts (Krippendorff, 2018).

The research framework incorporates critical discourse analysis grounded in hegemony theory. This theoretical perspective, frequently linked to Antonio Gramsci's scholarship, investigates the state's use of religious moderation to control society and advance its developmental agenda. The theory illuminates the mechanisms through which the state sustains its ideological supremacy without employing force or physical coercion, while simultaneously preventing the rise of competing or oppositional ideologies.

This study analyzes religious moderation through the lens of state hegemonic power. My objective is to elucidate contemporary interpretations of religious moderation and how associated policies are formulated. The central inquiry concerns the construction process of religious moderation policy. What objectives drive these policies? The analysis contends that the government advocates religious moderation to reinforce the legitimacy of what I term new nationalism. These policies seek to mold public understanding of the religion-state nexus. Officials work to establish ideological dominance regarding the significance of moderate principles in preserving Indonesia's unitary state (NKRI). Through educational systems, media platforms, religious institutions, and various governmental channels—bolstered by state resources and institutional leadership—the government disseminates religious moderation. Implementation strategies encompass training programs, academic research, establishing moderation centers, and conducting competency and professional assessments (Riley, 2011). This new nationalism, as I characterize it, does not emerge as a response to external factors like international political dynamics, economic rivalry, or colonial pressures. Instead, it targets domestic narratives that challenge state authority.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Since the 2014 presidential contest, Indonesia witnessed a division in its electorate based on religious affiliations. This phenomenon continued through Jokowi's second presidential campaign in 2019. The religious dynamics at play encompassed the amplification of religiously-framed hatred and the rise of religious populism deployed as an electoral strategy. Consequently, society experienced a surge in intolerant attitudes and conservative movements. These trends are viewed as significant "barriers and obstacles" to executing the government's policy objectives during its second term. Data from a 2020 survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) at the State Islamic University in Jakarta revealed that conservative viewpoints constituted 67.2% of religious discussions in digital spaces (PPIM UIN Jakarta). This leads me to conclude that advancing religious moderation represents a strategic state response to combat intolerance and conservatism.

The concept of moderation typically serves to counterbalance the powerful forces of extremism and radicalism (Indonesia, n.d.). This term derives from the Arabic 'wasatiyah,' signifying 'middle' or 'chosen,' as referenced in Surah al-Baqarah (2):143 with the phrase 'ummatan wasatan' (the middle community). While religious moderation lacks a universally agreed-upon definition, it can be understood using four criteria: 1) commitment to the nation; 2) tolerance; 3) rejection of violence; and 4) appreciation for local traditions (Indonesia, n.d.).

Nevertheless, the relationship between religious moderation and nationalism raises concerns regarding authority structures. State institutions might leverage such programs to strengthen their control, shape religious discourse, or promote particular ideological frameworks aligned with their political objectives. This convergence can generate friction, particularly when these measures appear to privilege certain religious communities or encroach upon religious liberties (Sutomo, n.d.). To bolster this article's analytical framework, I will organize the examination into three sections: religious moderation and governmental stability, religious moderation in fiscal allocations, and religious moderation balancing religious and national identities.

State Stability and the Moderation of Religious Expression

Multiple polling organizations have published findings concerning Indonesia's religious and political landscape. These studies reveal significant interconnections between faith and governance within Indonesian communities. This relationship means that policy-making frequently draws upon spiritual principles, while religious interpretation can be swayed by governmental actions and viewpoints. A 2021 study from the Indikator survey institute examining extremism and faith-based intolerance among youth (17-21 years old) discovered that 79.3% of Muslim respondents incorporate religious considerations into their decision-making processes. Furthermore, 49.4% indicated that Muslim radicalism demands immediate governmental focus, and 41.6% stressed the necessity for authorities to treat extremism as a serious concern requiring action (Indikator, 2021).

This evidence demonstrates that governmental approaches to moderating religious expression represent highly pertinent policy choices. Extremism tends to be perceived as a challenge originating within faith communities, which Muslim respondents believe warrants more pressing state involvement than tensions arising between different religious groups. For example, 61.7% of those surveyed expressed no objection to non-Muslims constructing worship facilities in their neighborhoods, and 64.8% were comfortable with non-Muslims conducting religious practices nearby (Indikator, 2021).

Additional research, including ISEAS's "The Indonesia National Survey Project 2022; Engaging with Developments in the Political, Economic and Social Spheres," revealed that 62.5% favor establishing Islamic legal principles in Indonesia due to their perceived capacity to reinforce societal moral standards. Among respondents, 55.5% identified divisive theological disputes among Muslims as the most critical issue confronting the Muslim community in Indonesia, while 19.1% voiced apprehension regarding religious leaders' participation in political affairs. Conversely, only 8.3% perceived Islamic doctrine as growing more intolerant and extremist, and merely 1.2% worried about expanding Christian influence. Critically, any examination of state intervention in internal religious affairs must prioritize encouraging moderate religious practices within these communities. The Setara Institute's 2022 report on religious freedom violations documented 51 incidents involving state actors versus 159 perpetrated by non-state entities. Analyzing victims reveals that Protestant Christians experienced the highest number of religious freedom violations, totaling 26 cases (Setara Institute, 2023).

This data provides substantial support for one dimension of religiously-informed political moderation. Yet regarding its purpose and direction, the approach appears to lack precise objectives. Concerns center primarily on relationships among co-religionists rather than interfaith dynamics. If moderating religious expression aims to combat intolerance, then religious policy appears oriented inward rather than toward understanding those of different faiths. The 2017 gubernatorial race in Jakarta's Special Capital District (DKI) brought attention to candidate Basuki Tjahya Purnama (Ahok)'s confrontational approach toward public discourse. His rival, Anis Baswedan, secured victory through a campaign marked by ethnic, religious, and racial divisiveness (sara). Subsequently, there has been a noticeable rise in the exploitation of religious symbols through populist political strategies motivated by electoral calculations. This pattern continued during the 2019 presidential contest when Jokowi pursued reelection.

Moderating religious expression may conflict with governmental political objectives, thereby weakening foundational societal commitments to preserving Indonesia's national unity. Both religiously-motivated intolerance and political populism are viewed as threats to governmental authority in executing future development initiatives and policies. Consequently, religious moderation should not be understood as a collective agreement on appropriate religious conduct, but instead as a political mechanism designed to ensure stability.

Incorporating Religious Moderation into the National Development Framework

Maintaining stability stands as a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable progress. Recognizing this critical need, the government has made stability promotion a key commitment, with its principal obstacle being the eradication of intolerant behaviors within communities. As a response, authorities have adopted religious moderation measures, integrating them into the RPJMN 2020-2024 framework as a strategic approach to combating intolerance. With its inclusion in the RPJMN, this religious moderation initiative will extend across all governmental ministries and agencies, with the Ministry of Religion designated as the implementing pioneer.

While the RPJMN framework establishes clear objectives, it operates within defined temporal boundaries. Conversely, intolerance manifested through extremism, radicalism, and terrorism defies temporal limitation. Consequently, policymakers implement religious moderation strategies that lend themselves to administrative tracking and measurement. Government entities accomplish this via their institutional structures and educational systems, focusing on training students and civil service personnel (ASN). Because administrative implementation in these two spheres allows for easier assessment and intervention, the outcome tends toward formal-ceremonial expressions of religious moderation. For example, authorities incorporate religious moderation content as an interview requirement within ASN recruitment examinations and for Government officials under employment agreements. Furthermore, nationwide assessments measuring religious moderation indices among ASN and PPPK personnel have been conducted, though without subsequent action.

Data from the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) indicates the 2022 potential radicalism index stood at 10%, reflecting a 2.2% reduction from the 2020 figure of 12.2%. These statistics prompt crucial inquiries regarding what drove this decrease—specifically, whether religious moderation policy implementation produced this effect, or whether it resulted from BNPT's function as Indonesia's primary counterterrorism entity under Law No. 5 of 2018 (Ludiana, 2022).

Because religious moderation initiatives emphasize administrative dimensions, practical execution frequently assumes ceremonial characteristics. Table 1 provides illustrations of such ceremonial implementations.

Table 1. Examples of Ceremonial Implementations in Religious Moderation Projects

No	Date	The Policies
1	October 24-26, 2022	Preparation of a Guide to Religious Moderation and Defence (MBBN) for General Universities (PTU) (Kemenag, 2023).
2	November 29, 2022	The Indonesia University (UI) has been selected as a pilot program for the Griya of Religious Moderation and State Defence (Maudisha, 2022). The GMBBN at PTU has outlined five key pledges: (1) Supporting and reinforcing dedication to the nation, embracing tolerance, rejecting violence, and respecting indigenous cultural practices, (2) Cultivating patriotic feelings, national awareness, and readiness to make sacrifices for both country and government, (3) Following and advancing principles of religious balance and national security within mainstream universities, and (4) Maintaining a commitment to serve as frontline defenders in upholding religious moderation and state protection.
3	December 27, 2022	The First Phase of the Index of Professionalism and Religious Moderation Survey (Kemenag, 2023). Religious Moderation Survey conducted on 214,306 of the 231,000 members of the Ministry of Religion.
4	December 28, 2022	The rector of Gajah Mada University has appointed a griya of religious moderation and state defence (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2022).
5	February 28, 2023	The second phase of the survey on the index of professionalism and religious moderation involved 17,471 ASN Kemenag (Kemenag, 2023).
6	October-November 2023	The Training of Trainers (ToT) program for Religious Moderation received 879 registration applications (Pendis Kemenag, 2023). From this pool, 443 candidates passed the administrative selection phase, with 300 ultimately chosen to take part in the training program. The Ministry of Finance's Education Fund Management Institute (LPDP) provides the funding for this Moderation Training of Trainers initiative.
7	October 17, 2023	The JDPMB (Diaspora Network of Religious Moderation Cadre) outlined six fundamental commitments in their declaration.42 These commitments encompass: (1) faith in one Supreme God, (2) dedication to Indonesia's foundational principles including Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhineka Tunggal Ika, and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, (3) commitment to promoting religious tolerance while upholding Indonesia's international reputation, (4) determination to fight against intolerance, radical ideologies, terrorist activities, and separatist movements in order to preserve national unity, (5) resolve to counter and oppose cross-border extremist influences that could undermine the nation's ideological foundation, and (6) pledge to serve the Indonesian nation through dedicated contributions and responsible action.

8	November 6-8, 2023	Gathering of the Student Press Institute (LPM) PTKIN at Hotel Santika Premier, Tanggerang South (Diktis Kemenag, 2023). 52 LPM PTKI participants attended the event.
9	September 28, 2023	The UIN Religious Moderation Center, Raden Intan Lampung, at Hotel Emersia, Bandar Lampung, organized a workshop on strengthening media syndication (Diktis Kemenag, 2024).
10	October 25-27, 2023	The Islamic Religious Higher Education Affirmation Scholarship (ADIKTIS) plays a crucial role in advancing religious moderation while supporting development in underdeveloped, frontier, and outermost regions (3T) (Diktis Kemenag, 2023). This initiative encompasses 24 Islamic higher education institutions (PTKIS), including institutions such as STAI Nias, STAI Abdur Rauf Singkil Aceh, STIT Ibnu Khaldun Nunukan, STAI Seram Timur, STAI NW Samawa Sumbawa, STIT Yamra Merauke, and others.
11	December 7-9, 2023	The Master Trainer Development Program for Religious Moderation (MOT MB) brought together a group of 30 attendees, comprising high-ranking representatives from multiple government ministries and agencies (K/L), along with widyaiswara instructors (Kemenag, 2023).

Numerous ceremonial initiatives remain undocumented, including scholarly work and community service rooted in moderate religious principles. Government funding has been directed toward advancing religious moderation and mobilizing communities, especially within educational and faith-based organizations. A key characteristic of this orchestration is establishing diverse teams and agencies to guarantee harmonized oversight of moderation policies. Examples include moderation centers at Islamic higher education institutions, moderation departments at public universities, volunteer networks, accredited training programs, and task forces created under Presidential Regulation No. 58 of 2023 to bolster religious moderation (Perpres, n.d.). Some Islamic Universities (PTKI) have even incorporated religious moderation into their curriculum.

The government partners with academic scholars to convince citizens that religious moderation reflects the nation's foundational principles. Authorities face challenges in demonstrating that religious moderation represents a genuine Indonesian social reality. Through moderation policies, the state connects historical struggles with contemporary intolerance issues. Via its network of influence, the government disseminates the message that religious moderation forms a vital component of the United Republic of Indonesia's (NKRI) continued existence. Rather than introducing novel concepts, the government seeks to standardize religious interpretations through governmental bodies and educational systems. State resources fund the promotion of moderation and civic participation under the banner of national unity. Nevertheless, authorities simultaneously dismiss opposing viewpoints and competing narratives.

One must ask whether religious moderation will remain permanently embedded in the RPJMN. Repeated inclusion of identical policies across multiple RPJMN cycles could indicate governmental failure to achieve program objectives. Religious moderation has fallen short of establishing a universally embraced identity, as it privileges certain citizens over others. The state has successfully shaped citizens' religious and cultural perspectives to reinforce national identity. Essentially, religious interpretations contradicting national identity are

labeled as immoderate. Whether one demonstrates moderation depends on their comprehension level and behaviors regarding national identity reinforcement. Authorities work to establish religious moderation as an authentic dimension of Indonesian society.

Jeremy Menchik presented 'Godly Nationalism' as an imagined community bound by shared consciousness—resulting from specific practices, namely orthodox theological understanding promoted by government and allied religious institutions. Menchik illustrated this through Indonesia's history of dynamically rejecting Ahmadiyya congregations. He contended this represented earnest efforts by both civil society and government to 'protect' the Indonesian nation through divine faith (Menchik, 2014). Menchik further observed that Indonesian nationalism is genealogically grounded in religious unity, even outside an Islamic state framework. Religious moderation matters because it opposes both secular nationalist perspectives and Islamic state advocates.

Religious Moderation in the Context of Religious and National Identity

The RPJMN 2020-2024 established a goal of achieving 75.8% for the religious community index (KUB) (Bappenas, 2024). Data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs indicates that by 2023, the KUB index reached 76.02%, surpassing the government's benchmark (Kemenag, 2023). However, this raises the question of whether religious moderation initiatives have genuinely achieved their intended outcomes.

Religious moderation policies are intrinsically connected to Jokowi's strategy for maintaining political stability and securing backing for his administration within and beyond parliamentary structures. Two prominent organizations, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defence Front (FPI), emerged as central forces opposing Jokowi's governance. During his initial term beginning in 2014, Jokowi successfully strengthened his political position by securing 70% support in parliament by 2016 (Warburton, 2016). Following this political consolidation, he pursued social-religious consolidation by disbanding HTI in 2017 using Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 02 of 2017, which modified Public Organization Act No. 17 of 2013. Subsequently, in 2020, he proceeded to prohibit FPI operations through a Joint Decision Letter (SKB) (SKB Ormas FPI, n.d.).

Dismantling HTI and prohibiting FPI established the groundwork for Jokowi to cultivate an alternative form of religious nationalism rooted in indigenous cultural traditions. Evidence includes incorporating traditional attire and local performing arts into official state ceremonies (Kemlu, 2024) and presenting Quranic recitations in Javanese (Jawi) style during State Palace functions, demonstrating commitment to preserving local heritage. HTI's dissolution symbolized governmental authority resisting transnational ideological movements perceived as undermining Pancasila ideology and threatening indigenous wisdom along with ethnic and cultural plurality. Similarly, the FPI prohibition represented state dominance over religiously motivated vigilante activities (premanisme), which authorities viewed as violating public order standards and compromising the legal system's integrity (Kompas Cyber Media, 2020).

This prompts an essential inquiry: where does this emerging religious nationalism originate? Its foundation lies in political processes. Consequently, nationality cannot be objectively predetermined based solely on religious, cultural, or social structural criteria before

political engagement occurs. This matters because nationalist movements actively construct national identity (Calhoun, 1997). Jokowi pursued political stability through religious moderation policies designed to mitigate religious-based social divisions within society. He utilized religious moderation as a mechanism to reconcile the expanding political gap separating right-wing organizations such as HTI and FPI from other Islamic constituencies. Nationalism links all citizens to overarching narratives concerning national objectives and Indonesia's foundational history—a conceptually neutral principle with enduring importance throughout Indonesian development (Anderson, n.d.).

Discourse hegemony theory suggests religious moderation functions as an instrument for state legitimization, wherein governmental priorities become identified with universal citizen interests. Consequently, religious moderation establishes normative standards that marginalize alternative perspectives or critical voices. Nationalism's formation develops in tandem with political transformation (Aspinall, 2016). Early post-independence Indonesian nationalism incorporated anti-colonial sentiments with right-wing characteristics alongside nationalization of foreign enterprises reflecting left-wing tendencies. Though anti-colonial concepts retain contemporary relevance, they now contend with right-wing Islamic ideological alternatives.

Bourchier observes a transition from democratic cosmopolitanism toward religious nationalism (Tandfonline, 2024). This shift manifests through rhetoric emphasizing "Muslim communities under oppression" or "Muslim exclusion," combining anti-foreign attitudes with narratives of Muslim marginalization. Throughout Jokowi's presidency, critics frequently characterized him as anti-Muslim and overly accommodating toward foreign interests, particularly Chinese investments. Right-wing Islamic factions attempt to control public narratives by emphasizing Muslim contributions to Indonesia's founding, thereby claiming authority for their religious nationalist discourse aligned with Jokowi's political agenda.

Roger Friedland and Kenneth B. Moss outline four foundational elements of religious nationalism: (1) states embrace religious identity as their normative and legal foundation; (2) constitutional religion carries salvific (soteriological) significance; (3) divine authority constitutes the source of state legal sovereignty; and (4) modern religious nationalism emphasizes robust connections between individuals, the state, and the nation-state. Though all elements matter, religious moderation policies particularly leverage the fourth component (Hemel & Szafrinec, 2016). Jokowi applies religious moderation to simultaneously address anti-foreign sentiment and Muslim marginalization narratives. This strategy seeks to standardize societal religious understanding under national security concerns while moderating anti-Islamic and foreign domination anxieties through national interest frameworks. The state constructs Indonesian society's reality as inherently moderate, attempting to convince citizens that religious moderation represents an authentic characteristic of Indonesian identity. Indonesia's continued existence stems from moderate religious interpretation—an impression potentially challenged by Middle Eastern political situations marked by religious extremism.

Jokowi's commitment to combating intolerance through religious moderation appears in multiple declarations. First, during his 2021 address opening the Ninth National Assembly

(MUNAS) of the Indonesian Islamic Proselytization Institute (LDII), Jokowi explicitly declared governmental dedication to advancing religious moderation, asserting that "intolerant attitudes, especially those involving physical and verbal violence, must be eliminated from Indonesian territory." Second, in April 2021, during the National Labor Assembly (Mukernas) and National Assemblies (Munas) at the State Palace, the National Revival Party (PKB) Chairman emphasized that the government maintains zero tolerance for intolerant actions threatening national and communal unity (Setneg, 2024).

Equally significant are cultural markers, which serve the government's purpose of demonstrating to citizens that moderate values already permeate their daily existence. This explains the logic behind avoiding the creation of a fresh, uniform definition of religious moderation—relying on measurable indicators proves adequate instead. The government's role should focus on validating and supporting the moderate religious principles and cultural traditions already embedded within communities, rather than redefining what these concepts mean.

Religious Moderation and Legal Implementation

A significant obstacle facing religious moderation efforts involves the judicial invalidation of the three-minister Joint Decree (SKB) concerning school uniform regulations. Through this SKB, government authorities—specifically the Ministers of Religion, Education, and Home Affairs—sought to advance religious moderation principles by establishing guidelines for dress codes and religious symbols in public schools under regional government jurisdiction at elementary and secondary levels (Setkab, 2024). This policy initiative emerged in response to an incident where a non-Muslim student at a state vocational high school (SMKN) faced requirements to wear Islamic headcovering. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined on February 3, 2021, that this moderation-driven decree conflicted with superior legal statutes. The Court consequently nullified the SKB, stripping it of any legal authority (Kemdikbud, 2023). Despite pushback from certain community segments after public hearings, the decree remained legally unenforceable (Madrim, 2021).

While governmental bodies may seek to shape religious moderation practices, the Supreme Court's (MA) nullification of the SKB demonstrates that such moderation initiatives remain vulnerable to judicial oversight rather than being immune to state institutional checks. Following the invalidation, authorities pursued no additional legal strategies to preserve the SKB as an expression of moderate religious policy. From my perspective, government institutions have failed to develop a comprehensive, legally-grounded framework for religious moderation that could inform more detailed regulatory implementation. This inadequacy becomes apparent in instances like the denial of construction permits for the Maranatha Church in Cilegon City, where religious moderation principles proved insufficient to address concrete operational matters, despite constitutional protections under the 1945 Constitution guaranteeing religious establishment rights (BBC News Indonesia, 2021).

These circumstances create risks of categorization and bias regarding diverse religious interpretations. This dynamic could serve as justification for branding individuals or groups as "immoderate," thereby portraying them as threats to the Unitary State of the Republic of

Indonesia (NKRI). Legal enforcement mechanisms for religious moderation derive from multiple presidential directives and Ministry of Religion regulations (PMA). Ministry of Religion Circular Letter (SE) No. 11 of 2023 governs the temporary conversion of ministry facilities into worship spaces (Kemenag, 2024). These regulatory frameworks strengthen arguments that religious moderation represents governmental intrusion into monitoring communal religious expression under the guise of contemporary religious nationalism.

CONCLUSION

In Indonesia's complex religious landscape, the notion of religious moderation holds considerable importance. The chronological evolution of religious discourse shows distinct phases: Nahdlatul 'Ulama first championed Islam Nusantara (Nusantara Islamic thought), followed by Muhammadiyah's introduction of Islam Berkemajuan (progressive Islam), and most recently, the government has taken the lead in promoting religious moderation. These various discourses may result in competitive dynamics, fragmentation, or mutual connections.

The state's endorsement of religious moderation in Indonesia raises important questions about governmental interference in religious matters. Indonesia occupies a middle ground—it is neither a theocracy nor a completely secular state. When the state becomes too deeply involved in religious issues, it risks sliding toward authoritarian control or fueling religious conservatism. Conversely, when the government distances itself from religious concerns, it enables political secularization that undermines its legitimate authority in religious domains. Yet religion's contribution to Indonesia's nationalist movement throughout history cannot be overlooked.

Understanding how religious moderation intersects with nationalism is essential for comprehending Indonesia's socio-political dynamics. Given Indonesia's reputation for cultural and religious diversity, the nation faces ongoing challenges in balancing religious plurality with cohesive national unity. This study acknowledges its constraints, particularly its lack of examination regarding resistance movements or counter-hegemonic responses to religious moderation initiatives.

Religious tensions persist as a major concern across numerous nations, affecting social, economic, and political dimensions. Though manageable at times, these tensions continually emerge in evolving configurations—the Israeli military operations in Gaza serve as one example. Religious sentiment, while not the sole determining factor, significantly influences how different nations respond to such conflicts based on their domestic religious contexts. These responses may generate novel forms of nationalism with dual potential: they could prove advantageous in certain respects while simultaneously threatening political stability. This article's central aim is to critically examine the persuasive rationale supporting religious moderation within religious social movements. Nevertheless, the article maintains that Indonesia's interfaith interactions offer robust practical evidence supporting religious moderation principles. However, the state currently leverages this concept within frameworks of political authority and control.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Republik Indonesia. (2020). *Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 18 Tahun 2020 tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional Tahun 2020–2024*. JDIH Kemenkumham. https://jdih.kemenkum.go.id/common/dokumen/2020pr018.pdf

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (2021). *Keputusan Menteri Agama Nomor 529 Tahun 2021 tentang Kelompok Kerja Penguatan Program Moderasi Beragama pada Kementerian Agama*. JDIH Kemenag. https://jdih.kemenag.go.id/regulation/keputusan-menteri-agama-nomor-529-tahun-2021-tentang-kelompok-kerja-penguatan-program-moderasi-beragama-pada-kementerianagama

Alvian, R. A., & Ardhani, I. (2023). The politics of moderate Islam in Indonesia: Between international pressure and domestic contestations. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, 61*(1), 19–57. https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2023.611.19-57

Anderson, B. (n.d.). *Imagined communities* [PDF]. Retrieved January 7, 2024, from https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/SOC571E/um/Anderson_B_-_Imagined_Communities.pdf

Aspinall, E. (2016). The new nationalism in Indonesia. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 3*(1), 72–82. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.111

Azizah, Q., Shidqi, D. S., & Pratiwi, I. A. (n.d.). *Strengthening religious moderation through fable activities in early childhood.*

Bahri, A. S., Hanafi, S. M., Markarma, A., & Megandani, A. (2022). Sharia financial literature in promoting religious moderation in Indonesia. *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan, 20*(2), 413–444. https://doi.org/10.31291/jlka.v20i2.1091

BBC News Indonesia. (n.d.). *Pendirian gereja ditolak: Warganet pertanyakan langkah wali kota, "inikah namanya toleransi?"* Retrieved January 10, 2024, from https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-62836957

Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Berbusana adat Tanimbar Presiden Jokowi sampaikan pidato di Gedung Nusantara.* Retrieved January 12, 2024, from https://kemlu.go.id/portal/i/read/5085/berita/berbusana-adat-tanimbar-presiden-jokowi-sampaikan-pidato-di-gedung-nusantara

Calhoun, C. (1997). *Nationalism.* Open University Press.

Cholil, S. (2023). Freedom of religion amid polarization and religious moderation policy. *Interreligious Studies and Intercultural Theology, 6*(2), 196–204. https://doi.org/10.1558/isit.24603

(n.d.). Cultural theory and popular culture: A reader.

Djainudin, H. (2022). The conception of religious moderation in interfaith dialogue in Indonesia: Case study in Flores Nusa Tenggara Timur. *Humanika, 22*(2), 139–146. https://doi.org/10.21831/hum.v22i2.54304

Fahmi, R., & Aswirna, P. (2022). Building moderation Islam in plural community: Relation between social media and social conflicts in Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia. *AJIS: Academic Journal of Islamic Studies, 7*(2), 343. https://doi.org/10.29240/ajis.v7i2.4433

Faisal, A., Pabbajah, M., Abdullah, I., Muhammad, N. E., & Rusli, M. (2022). Strengthening religious moderatism through the traditional authority of kiai in Indonesia. *Cogent Social Sciences, 8*(1), 2150450. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2022.2150450

Formichi, C. (2010). Pan-Islam and religious nationalism: The case of Kartosuwiryo and Negara Islam Indonesia. *Indonesia, (90)*, 125–146.

(n.d.). Laporan KBB 2020 Setara Institute [PDF]. Retrieved December 15, 2023, from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KetfG93DhNBDM45InuUNR2qy71Y5Tp_X/view

(n.d.). SKB ORMAS FPI [PDF]. Retrieved December 14, 2023, from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mlJrBx_vsj6urjnQGU3tc4X4NrnEzKzI/view

Gumuruh, A. R. (2023). Religious moderation in the context of Pancasila: A study of role and the impact is deep maintaining social harmony. *Islamika Inside: Jurnal Keislaman dan Humaniora, 9*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.35719/islamikainside.v9i1.243

Grehenson, G. (2022, December 29). *Rektor UGM lantik pengelola Griya Moderasi Beragama dan Bela Negara.* Universitas Gadjah Mada. https://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/23322-rektor-ugm-lantik-pengelola-griya-moderasi-beragama-dan-bela-negara/

Hakim, L., Meria, A., & Suryadinata, S. (2023). Religious moderation in Indonesian context. *Al-Albab, 12*(1), 95–112. https://doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v12i1.2619

van den Hemel, E., & Szafraniec, A. (Eds.). (2016). Thinking through religious nationalism. In *Religious language matters* (with R. Friedland & K. B. Moss). Fordham University Press.

Hs, M. A. (2021). Moderasi beragama Muhammadiyah dalam kajian kesarjanaan Indonesia: Antara studi dan dakwah Islam. *MAARIF, 16*(1), 79–97. https://doi.org/10.47651/mrf.v16i1.135

Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Bendung intoleransi global, Kemenag deklarasi jaringan diaspora penggerak moderasi beragama.* Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://diktis.kemenag.go.id/v1/berita/bendung-intoleransi-global-kemenag-deklarasi-jaringan-diaspora-penggerak-moderasi-beragama

Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Bukan sebatas program, moderasi beragama harus jadi religious calling.* Retrieved January 7, 2024, from https://diktis.kemenag.go.id/v1/berita/bukan-sebatas-program-moderasi-beragama-harus-jadi-religious-calling

Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Penguatan moderasi beragama di wilayah 3T.* Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://diktis.kemenag.go.id/v1/berita/penguatan-moderasi-beragama-di-wilayah-3t

Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Pengurus LPM PTKI se-Indonesia hadiri kopdar penguatan moderasi beragama.* Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://diktis.kemenag.go.id/v1/berita/pengurus-lpm-ptki-se-indonesia-hadiri-kopdar-penguatan-moderasi-beragama

Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. (2018, May 1). *Presiden: Indonesia negara beragam namun hidup dalam kerukunan.* https://setkab.go.id/presiden-indonesia-negara-beragam-namun-hidup-dalam-kerukunan/

Idi, A., & Priansyah, D. (2023). The role of religious moderation in Indonesian multicultural society: A sociological perspective. *Asian Journal of Engineering, Social and Health, 2*(4), 246–258. https://doi.org/10.46799/ajesh.v2i4.55

Inayatillah. (2021). Moderasi beragama di kalangan milenial: Peluang, tantangan, kompleksitas dan tawaran solusi. *Tazkir: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial dan Keislaman, 7*(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.24952/tazkir.v7i1.4235

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, Badan Litbang dan Diklat. (2019). *Moderasi beragama* (Cetakan pertama). Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Kementerian Agama RI.

Irham, M. A., Ruslan, I., & Syahputra, M. C. (2021). *The idea of religious moderation in Indonesian New Order and the Reform Era. (Lengkapi nama jurnal/prosiding, volume, nomor, dan halaman jika ada).*

Ismail, F. (n.d.). *Rumah Moderasi Beragama (RMB).*

PPIM UIN Jakarta. (2022, March 14). *Konservatisme di dunia maya: Bagaimana mengkampanyekan moderasi beragama?* https://ppim.uinjkt.ac.id/download/konservatisme-di-dunia-maya-bagaimana-mengkampanyekan-moderasi-beragama/

Jasnida. (2021, June 21). *K.H. Yahya Cholil Staquf berikan orasi ilmiah pada wisuda online UIN Suska Riau.* Universitas Islam Negeri Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau. https://www.uinsuska.ac.id/blog/2021/06/21/k-h-yahya-cholil-staquf-berikan-orasi-ilmiah-pada-wisuda-online-uin-suska-riau/

Jura, D. (2021). Religious moderation: An approach of religious life in Indonesia. *Jurnal Inovasi Penelitian, 1*(10), 10. https://doi.org/10.47492/jip.v1i10.407

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *17.472 ASN Kemenag ikuti Survei Indeks Profesionalisme dan MB Tahap 2.* Retrieved December 31, 2023, from https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/17472-asn-kemenag-ikuti-survei-indeks-profesionalisme-dan-mb-tahap-2-n66mu1

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *214.306 ASN Kemenag ikuti Survei Indeks Profesionalisme dan Moderasi Beragama.* Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/214306-asn-kemenag-ikuti-survei-indeks-profesionalisme-dan-moderasi-beragama-vd8h2l

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, Balitbang Diklat. (n.d.). *Dashboard.* Retrieved December 2, 2023, from https://balitbangdiklat.kemenag.go.id/halaman/dashboard-indeks-kub

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Kemenag bentuk Griya Moderasi Beragama dan Bela Negara.* Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/kemenag-bentuk-griya-moderasi-beragama-dan-bela-negara-whso33

Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, Balitbang Diklat. (n.d.). *Survei Kompas: Dampak moderasi beragama sudah dirasakan masyarakat.* Retrieved December 10, 2023, from

https://balitbangdiklat.kemenag.go.id/berita/survei-kompas-dampak-moderasi-beragama-sudah-dirasakan-masyarakat

Krippendorff, K. (2018). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology* (4th ed.). SAGE.

(n.d.). Teks lengkap "Pesan Bogor" yang disepakati ulama dunia. kumparan. Retrieved January 4, 2024, from https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/teks-lengkap-pesan-bogor-yang-disepakati-ulama-dunia

Kusmidi, H. (2023). An overview of Islam and religious moderation: Concept, principles, and indicators. *Jurnal Ilmiah Syi'ar, 22*(2), 168. https://doi.org/10.29300/syr.v22i2.8752

(n.d.). Lampiran 1. Narasi RPJMN 2020–2024 [PDF]. Retrieved January 10, 2024, from https://perpustakaan.bappenas.go.id/e-library/file_upload/koleksi/migrasi-datapublikasi/file/RP_RKP/Dokumen%20RPJMN%202020-2024/Lampiran%201.%20Narasi%20RPJMN%202020-2024.pdf

Ludiana, F. (2022, December 29). *BNPT: Indeks resiko terorisme dan potensi radikalisme di 2022 turun.* Kementerian PANRB. https://www.menpan.go.id/site/berita-terkini/berita-daerah/bnpt-indeks-resiko-terorisme-dan-potensi-radikalisme-di-2022-turun

Madrim, S. (2021, November 2). Eksaminasi publik: Putusan MA soal SKB 3 Menteri seragam sekolah menyesatkan publik. *VOA Indonesia.* https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/eksaminasi-publik-putusan-ma-soal-skb-3-menteri-seragam-sekolah-menyesatkan-publik/6296276.html

Massoweang, A. K. (n.d.). Moderasi beragama dalam lektur keagamaan Islam di kawasan Timur Indonesia. In *(Lengkapi judul buku editor & halaman jika ada)*. Penerbit BRIN. Retrieved January 11, 2024, from https://penerbit.brin.go.id/press

Maudisha. (2022, November 30). *UI terpilih sebagai piloting program "Griya Moderasi Beragama dan Bela Negara."* Universitas Indonesia. https://www.ui.ac.id/ui-terpilih-sebagai-piloting-program-griya-moderasi-beragama-dan-bela-negara/

Kompas.com. (2020, December 30). *6 alasan pemerintah bubarkan dan larang kegiatan FPI...* https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/30/14545951/6-alasan-pemerintah-bubarkan-dan-larang-kegiatan-fpi

Menchik, J. (2014). Productive intolerance: Godly nationalism in Indonesia. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 56*(3), 591–621. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000267

Murtadlo, M. (n.d.). Pendidikan moderasi beragama: Membangun harmoni, memajukan negeri. In *(Lengkapi judul buku editor & halaman jika ada)*. Penerbit BRIN. Retrieved January 10, 2024, from https://penerbit.brin.go.id/press

Nasaruddin, H. T. N., Prianto, B., & Hariyanto, T. (2020). Social behavior in religious moderation (Study of social reality of communities in Tohpati and Taliwang in Cakranegara Utara Village, Cakranegara District, Indonesia). *International Journal of Advances in Scientific Research and Engineering, 6*(9), 62–71. https://doi.org/10.31695/IJASRE.2020.33882

Kementerian Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. (n.d.). *Presiden: Tak ada kompromi bagi intoleransi yang rusak sendi kehidupan bernegara.* Retrieved January 12, 2024, from

https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/presiden_tak_ada_kompromi_bagi_intoleransi_yang_rusak_sendi_kehidupan_bernegara

Nurfatoni, M. (2021, September 4). *Pidato lengkap Haedar Nashir di Tanwir Muhammadiyah.* PWMU.CO. https://pwmu.co/207492/09/04/pidato-lengkap-haedar-nashir-di-tanwir-muhammadiyah/

(n.d.). Pemerintah terbitkan SKB penggunaan pakaian seragam dan atribut bagi peserta didik, pendidik, dan tenaga kependidikan pada sekolah negeri. Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://gtk.kemdikbud.go.id/read-news/pemerintah-terbitkan-skb-penggunaan-pakaian-seragam-dan-atribut-bagi-peserta-didik-pendidik-dan-tenaga-kependidikan-pada-sekolah-negeri

Pendis Kemenag. (n.d.). *Pendaftaran trainer moderasi beragama dimulai, catat tanggalnya!* Retrieved December 31, 2023, from https://pendis.kemenag.go.id/read/pendaftaran-trainer-moderasi-beragama-dimulai-catat-tanggalnya

Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia. (2023). *Peraturan Presiden (Perpres) Nomor 58 Tahun 2023 tentang Penguatan Moderasi Beragama.* https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/265185/perpres-no-58-tahun-2023

Ramdhani, M. A., Sapdi, R. M., Zain, M., et al. (n.d.). *Moderasi beragama berlandaskan nilai-nilai Islam.*

Rasyid, A., Muvid, M. B., Lubis, M. A., & Kurniawan, P. (2022). Actualization of the concept of national fiqh in building religious moderation in Indonesia. *Millah: Journal of Religious Studies,* 433–464. https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.vol21.iss2.art5

Ridha, A. (2023). The role of Bugis cultural values in realizing religious moderation. *Al-Izzah: Jurnal Hasil-Hasil Penelitian,* 75. https://doi.org/10.31332/ai.v0i0.6032

Riley, D. J. (2011). Hegemony, democracy, and passive revolution in Gramsci's prison notebooks. *California Italian Studies, 2*(2). https://doi.org/10.5070/C322008962

(n.d.). Rilis survei Indikator (21 Maret 2021) [PDF]. Retrieved December 31, 2023, from https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Rilis-Survei-Indikator_21-Maret-2021.pdf

Rismawati, S. D., Qomariyah, S., Devy, H. S., Maisyal, N., & A'yun, Q. (2021). *The legal politics of religious moderation in Indonesia: Responsive or repressive? (Lengkapi nama jurnal, volume/nomor, halaman jika ada).*

Salim, L., & Rosada, A. A. (2023). Conflict management in Indonesia through religious moderation. *KnE Social Sciences.* https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v8i16.14041

(n.d.). Salinan SKB Mendikbud–Mendagri–Menag [PDF]. Retrieved January 8, 2024, from https://setkab.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/SALINAN-SKB-Mendikbud-Mendagri-Menag-CAP.pdf

(n.d.). Surat Edaran Menteri Agama Nomor 11 Tahun 2023 [PDF]. Retrieved January 8, 2024, from https://cdn.kemenag.go.id/storage/archives/se-menag-11-tahun-2023pdf.pdf

Subchi, I., Zulkifli, Z., Latifa, R., & Sa'diyah, S. (2022). Religious moderation in Indonesian Muslims. *Religions, 13*(5), 451. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13050451

Sutomo, I. (n.d.). Indonesian religious figures. *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, 11*(1). *(Lengkapi tahun & halaman jika ada.)*

Syafieh, & Anzhaikan, M. (2022). The moderate Islam and its influence on religious diversity in Indonesia. *ESENSIA: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin, 23*(2), 2. https://doi.org/10.14421/esensia.v23i2.3262

(n.d.). Two decades of ideological contestation in Indonesia: From democratic cosmopolitanism to religious nationalism. Retrieved January 11, 2024, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620

Warburton, E. (2016). Jokowi and the new developmentalism. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 52*(3), 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262

Widigdo, M. S. A., & Pawi, A. A. A. (2023). "Reason" of political and religious moderation in the book of *Ghiyāth al-Umam* by al-Juwaynī and its contemporary Southeast Asian context. *Cogent Arts & Humanities, 10*(1), 2223815. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2023.2223815

Yunus, A. R., & Hanafiah, T. (2020). *The state policy epistemology related to religious moderation: A comparative study of Indonesia and Australia*, 19 (20).