

Disciplined Pluralism: Reconciling Feyerabend's 'Anything Goes' with the Hermeneutical Tradition of Islamic Ijtihad

Titi Yansi* | Universitas PTIQ, Jakarta, Indonesia
Sahrn Anas | Universitas PTIQ, Jakarta, Indonesia
Agung Sholihin | Universitas PTIQ, Jakarta, Indonesia
Moh. Ilman Nur Hakim | Universitas PTIQ, Jakarta, Indonesia
Nurlailasari Heni Kosasih | Universitas PTIQ, Jakarta, Indonesia
*Correspondence: titiyansi02@gmail.com

Abstract:

This article critically examines the philosophical resonances between Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and the Islamic intellectual tradition of *ijtihad*, situating both within the broader problematic of methodological rigidity in contemporary Islamic scholarship. The growing hegemony of singular epistemological frameworks within Islamic studies has demonstrably contributed to interpretive stagnation and curtailed the creative latitude of Muslim scholars. Employing a qualitative library-based research design, this study systematically analyzes Feyerabend's principal philosophical texts alongside canonical and contemporary sources in Islamic epistemology. Through descriptive and comparative methods, the inquiry maps conceptual convergences between Feyerabend's thoroughgoing critique of methodological absolutism, most forcefully articulated through his celebrated principle of "anything goes", and the inherently pluralistic character of *ijtihad* as it was practiced by the classical jurists of Islam. The findings establish that both intellectual traditions affirm the primacy of intellectual freedom, contextual reasoning, and methodological diversity in the pursuit of knowledge. Rather than endorsing epistemic relativism, the synthesis proposed here offers a model of methodological openness grounded in ethical accountability and revealed norms. The article contends that this epistemological convergence can invigorate contemporary *ijtihad* by cultivating an inclusive, adaptive, and contextually sensitive paradigm of Islamic knowledge production, one capable of engaging substantively with modern scientific rationality while remaining faithful to the normative foundations of Islamic thought.

Keywords: Hermeneutical Tradition; *Ijtihad*; Islamic Epistemology; Methodological Pluralism; Paul Feyerabend.

Introduction

Among the foundational pillars upon which the architecture of Islamic legal thought rests, few concepts carry the epistemological weight of *ijtihad*. Understood in its fullest sense, *ijtihad* designates the rigorous intellectual effort by which qualified Muslim scholars engage the primary sources of revelation—the Qur'an and the prophetic tradition (*Sunnah*)—in order to derive legal and ethical rulings that speak to the conditions of a given time and place. This process is not reducible to mere jurisprudential technique; it constitutes, at a deeper level, a mode of epistemological engagement with the divine word and the ever-shifting landscape of human experience. Sarmiji has observed that an epistemological orientation toward *ijtihad* is what enables Islamic law to sustain its relevance amid historical transformation, particularly through the methodological mediation of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, the higher objectives of Islamic jurisprudence.¹

The prevailing assumption that the “gate of *ijtihad*” was definitively sealed after the classical era has been compellingly challenged by contemporary scholars. Zuhendra, for instance, has argued that the rationalization of Islamic law continued unabated even in periods ostensibly marked by intellectual conservatism, albeit in forms that were not always visibly continuous with classical methodological norms.² This line of argument suggests that *ijtihad* is not merely a historical phenomenon but a living intellectual practice, one whose epistemological premises must be continually interrogated and renewed in light of contemporary intellectual challenges.

It is against this backdrop that the thought of Paul Feyerabend acquires a certain unexpected relevance. In his landmark work *Against Method* (1975), Feyerabend mounted a sustained and provocative critique of the very idea that scientific knowledge is governed by a single, universally applicable methodology.³ His principal thesis, encapsulated in the deceptively simple maxim “anything goes”, was not an invitation to intellectual chaos, but rather a philosophical argument to the effect that the most fertile moments in the history of human knowledge have typically been those in which thinkers dared to break with reigning methodological orthodoxies. The structural parallel with *ijtihad* is striking: both traditions, each in its distinct idiom, valorize the freedom of reasoned inquiry over the tyranny of methodological conformism.

A number of scholars have already noted broad affinities between Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and Islamic intellectual culture. Wahyudi and collaborators have examined its implications for academic creativity within

¹ Sarmiji, “Peranan Epistemologi dalam Membangun Hukum Islam,” *Journal of Islamic and Law Studies* 4, no. 1 (2020): 1–15.

² J. Zuhendra, “Fresh Ijtihad sebagai Upaya dalam Meretas Tertutupnya Pintu Ijtihad: Studi Perkembangan Hukum Islam pada Masa Kontemporer,” *Al-Qanun: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pembaharuan Hukum Islam* 26, no. 1 (2023): 83–95.

³ M. N. Wahyudi, “Epistemologi Islam di Era Modern: Studi Feyerabend tentang Anarkisme Epistemologi,” *Almahra: Jurnal Studi Islam* 2, no. 2 (2021): 134–148.

Islamic educational institutions.⁴ Faradi and associates have positioned it as a critical resource against positivistic rigidities in the study of religion.⁵ Kurdi has explored its resonances with the plurality of Qur'anic hermeneutical approaches,⁶ while Tahir has reflected on its contribution to the philosophical renewal of Islamic studies more broadly.⁷ Yet these contributions, valuable as they are, have largely remained at the level of conceptual analogy without developing a sustained methodological framework that demonstrates how epistemological anarchism might function concretely within the practice of *ijtihad*.

The present study addresses that lacuna. Its aim is threefold: first, to reconstruct Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism with sufficient philosophical precision to make productive comparison possible; second, to map the epistemological principles that structure the classical tradition of *ijtihad*; and third, to develop an integrative framework that demonstrates how Feyerabend's methodological pluralism can genuinely enrich—without dissolving—the hermeneutical plurality already latent within Islamic jurisprudence. Throughout, the study remains attentive to the critical distinction between epistemological openness, which both traditions espouse, and epistemic relativism, which neither can, in the end, tolerate.

This study adopts a qualitative approach grounded in library-based research methodology. The data corpus consists of primary philosophical texts by Paul Feyerabend—most notably *Against Method* and *Science in a Free Society*—alongside classical and contemporary works in Islamic epistemology and jurisprudence. The selection of library research as the methodological vehicle reflects the fundamental nature of philosophical inquiry, which aims not at the collection of empirical data but at the interpretive analysis of conceptual structures and their mutual relationships.

The analytical procedure proceeds across three distinct phases. In the first phase, Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism is systematically reconstructed from his principal texts in order to establish a rigorous account of its core claims and their philosophical context. In the second phase, the epistemological foundations of *ijtihad* are mapped through engagement with classical *usul al-fiqh* (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) literature and its contemporary interpreters, with particular attention to the methodological diversity that characterizes different juridical schools. In the third and final phase, the two intellectual frameworks are brought into comparative dialogue through a descriptive-comparative method, which aims to identify both structural convergences and irreducible differences. The ultimate objective is a

⁴ M. A. Wahyudi, S. Rijal, Silahuddin, and M. Ikhwan, "Implikasi Epistemologis Pemikiran Filsafat Paul Karl Feyerabend: Kebebasan Akademik Dalam Pengembangan Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam," *Academic Journal of Islamic Principles and Philosophy* 4, no. 1 (2023): 135–154.

⁵ A. A. Faradi, I. Tulungagung, J. Mayor, and S. Timur, *Dan Implikasinya Terhadap Pemikiran Islam* (2010).

⁶ Kurdi, "Feyerabend Dalam Studi Ilmu Tafsir Al-Quran," *Religia* 18, no. 1 (2015): 1–26.

⁷ M. Tahir, "Kontribusi Pemikiran Filsafat Anarkisme Epistemologi Paul K. Feyerabend Terhadap Studi Islam," *Lentera* 18, no. 2 (2016): 1–13.

synthetic epistemological framework capable of illuminating the productive tensions and genuine compatibilities between Western philosophy of science and Islamic hermeneutical tradition.

Paul Karl Feyerabend and the Epistemology of Anarchism

Intellectual Biography

Paul Karl Feyerabend was born on 13 January 1924 in Vienna, Austria, and died in 1994 in Zurich, Switzerland. He stands as one of the most provocative and intellectually restless figures produced by twentieth-century philosophy of science. His early intellectual formation was in the natural sciences, specifically physics and astronomy, a background that would prove decisive in shaping both the substance and the style of his later philosophical interventions. His philosophical apprenticeship under Karl Popper drew him initially toward critical rationalism, a framework he would subsequently interrogate and dismantle. His extended intellectual exchange with Imre Lakatos—whose methodology of scientific research programmes offered a more historically sensitive alternative to naive falsificationism—provided the dialectical context within which Feyerabend's most radical arguments took shape.⁸

Feyerabend is commonly situated within the post-positivist and relativist currents of the philosophy of science, though he resisted easy categorization. His intellectual trajectory was consistently animated by two fundamental convictions: that the history of science is far messier, more contingent, and more creative than any methodological prescription can capture; and that human freedom, including the freedom of inquiry, is too precious to be sacrificed at the altar of methodological orthodoxy. These convictions found their most concentrated expression in *Against Method* (1975), which remains his most widely read and discussed work.⁹

The Architecture of Epistemological Anarchism

Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism rests on a thoroughgoing critique of what he termed methodological universalism—the assumption that there exists a single, timeless, and universally applicable set of rules that distinguishes genuine science from its counterfeits and that governs the production of legitimate knowledge.¹⁰ His critique operates simultaneously at two levels, which are worth distinguishing analytically even if they remain deeply intertwined in his actual arguments.

⁸ M. N. Wahyudi, "Islamic Epistemology in the Modern Era : An Analytical Study of Feyerabend's Thought on Epistemological Anarchism," *Almahra: Jurnal Studi Islam* 2, no. 2 (2021), 134–148.

⁹ Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: New Left Books, 1975).

¹⁰ R. A. Iskandar and S. Sauri, "Scientific Structure Revolution, Epistemological Anarchism, and the Research Program in the New Philosophy of Science," *Al-Afkar Journal for Islamic Studies* 7, no. 2 (2024): 1–11.

At the first level, his critique targets science as a *method*, what he calls the “against method” dimension. The claim here is not that scientists do not follow procedures, but that the procedures they follow are irreducibly heterogeneous, historically contingent, and context-specific. No meta-rule governing all legitimate scientific practice can be extracted from the actual history of science without falsifying that history. The “anything goes” maxim, widely misread as an endorsement of methodological nihilism, is better understood as an ironic reductio: if we insist on a universal method, then the only candidate that actually fits the historical record of scientific achievement is the empty one that permits everything.¹¹

At the second level, his critique targets science as a social *institution* and ideological *authority*, the “against science” dimension. Here, Feyerabend’s argument has a political as well as a philosophical edge. He contends that when science is elevated to the status of the sole arbiter of what counts as knowledge, it becomes an instrument of cultural domination, displacing and delegitimizing other epistemic traditions, including religious, indigenous, and humanistic modes of knowing.¹² In this respect, Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism is continuous with a broader commitment to the pluralization of epistemic authority and the democratic dispersal of the right to determine what counts as knowledge.

Table 1. The Two Dimensions of Feyerabend’s Epistemological Anarchism

Dimension of Critique	Core Argument
<i>Against Science (anti-science)</i>	Feyerabend challenged the ideological elevation of science as the sole legitimate arbiter of knowledge. He argued that when science is treated as an unquestionable authority, it functions as a form of dogma — not unlike the ecclesiastical institutions it once displaced. In this respect, “civilized” rationality becomes a new form of coercion, one no less restrictive than medieval scholasticism.
<i>Against Method (anti-method)</i>	Feyerabend contested the presupposition — widespread among scientists and philosophers of science alike — that there exists a single, universally applicable, and ahistorical method capable of adjudicating all legitimate knowledge claims. For him, the history of science itself provides ample evidence that breakthroughs have often occurred precisely when thinkers violated prevailing methodological conventions.

Source: Elaborated from Feyerabend (1975) and secondary literature

¹¹ N. Nurnazmi, H. S. S. A. Mahmoud, and M. Anas, “Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul Karl Feyerabend dalam Kajian Ilmu Pengetahuan,” *Edu Sociata: Jurnal Pendidikan Sosiologi* 6, no. 1 (2023): 41–55.

Crucially, Feyerabend's anarchism does not amount to an abolition of standards. Rather, it insists that standards must remain context-sensitive, subject to revision, and open to contestation. The pluralistic spirit he advocates is one in which knowledge grows through the dialogue, and sometimes the tension, between competing methodological approaches, rather than through the triumph of any single one. This point has significant implications for the encounter with Islamic epistemology, where, as we shall see, a comparable commitment to methodological plurality has historically been operative within the practice of *ijtihad*.¹³ Feyerabend's works ultimately provided new intellectual impetus for rethinking knowledge systems beyond the confines of Western science, an opening that Islamic scholarship has begun, albeit tentatively, to explore.¹⁴

The Epistemology of Ijtihad in The Islamic Tradition

Conceptual Foundations

Etymologically, the term *ijtihad* derives from the Arabic root *jim-ha-dal*, which carries the semantic field of exertion, striving, and the expenditure of one's full capacity. In its technical jurisprudential sense, *ijtihad* denotes the maximum intellectual effort deployed by a qualified Muslim scholar in the task of deriving legal and ethical guidance from the primary sources of Islamic revelation—the Qur'an and the prophetic *Sunnah*—in cases where those sources do not provide explicit and determinate rulings.¹⁵ It is, in other words, an act of authorized interpretive reasoning, one that requires deep mastery of the Arabic language, comprehensive knowledge of revelation and the sciences of hadith criticism, familiarity with the consensus of previous scholars (*ijma'*), and, crucially, an acute understanding of the social and historical conditions that constitute the context of legal reasoning.¹⁶

Ijtihad is not, it should be stressed, an exercise in unconstrained individual opinion. The tradition has always maintained stringent criteria for the qualifications of the *mujtahid*—the scholar entitled to engage in independent legal reasoning. These include, inter alia: command of classical Arabic sufficient to read the primary sources without mediation; comprehensive knowledge of the Qur'an and its sciences; mastery of the prophetic traditions (*hadith*) and the criteria for their evaluation; knowledge of *nasikh wa mansukh* (the abrogating and abrogated rulings); familiarity with the scholarly consensus on established questions; and the ability to apply analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) with methodological rigor.¹⁷

¹³ D. S. Muhyiddin, N. F. Natsir, and E. Haryanti, "Memahami Gagasan Anything Goes Paul Karl Feyerabend dan Implikasinya terhadap Pendidikan Islam," *JlIP – Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pendidikan* 5, no. 1 (2022): 290–301.

¹⁴ N. Ahmad, "Pemikiran Paul K. Feyerabend Tentang Anarkis Epistemologi Dan Implikasinya Pada Studi Islam," *Halaqah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2024): 109–127.

¹⁵ Amalia Azahra et al., "Peran Ijtihad dalam Menjawab Tantangan Hukum Islam di Era Modern," *Journal of Student Research* 3, no. 5 (2025): 9–14.

¹⁶ R. Bahri, "Mengembangkan Kompetensi Abad 21 dalam Pendidikan Islam: Telaah Perspektif al-Quran dan Hadis," *Fakta: Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam* 3, no. 1 (2023): 1–10.

¹⁷ R. H. Manik et al., "Peran Ijtihad dalam Menjawab Tantangan Hukum Islam di Era Modern," *Jurnal Kajian dan Penelitian Umum* 2, no. 6 (2024): 118–126.

Historical Development

The historical roots of *ijtihad* reach back to the earliest period of Islam. The most celebrated early account of its legitimacy involves Mu'adh ibn Jabal, whom the Prophet dispatched to Yemen as a governor. When asked how he would adjudicate disputes, Mu'adh replied that he would consult the Qur'an first, then the *Sunnah*, and if neither provided explicit guidance, he would exercise his own reasoned judgment (*ijtihad bi-ra'yi*). The Prophet's reported approval of this response established a normative warrant for independent legal reasoning that would prove foundational for subsequent jurisprudential development.¹⁸ The Companions of the Prophet, most notably Abu Bakr, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, actively deployed *ijtihad* in addressing the novel challenges that arose in the rapidly expanding Muslim polity,¹⁹ a practice continued and systematized by the subsequent generations of *tabi'un* and *atba' al-tabi'un*.²⁰

The classical golden age of *ijtihad*, spanning roughly the second through fourth centuries of the Islamic calendar, witnessed the crystallization of the major juridical schools (*madhahib*) that continue to structure Sunni legal reasoning to this day.²¹ The divergent methodological orientations of the founding imams are themselves testimony to the pluralism inherent in the *ijtihad* tradition. Abu Hanifah, working in the heterogeneous and cosmopolitan environment of Iraq, developed a juridical methodology that accorded considerable weight to rational reasoning (*ra'y*) and analogical extrapolation (*qiyas*).²² Malik ibn Anas, by contrast, rooted his jurisprudence in the living practice of the Medinan community, treating the '*amal ahl al-Madinah*' (the established custom of the Medina community) as a privileged form of transmitted knowledge.²³ These differences represent not inconsistency but contextually calibrated responses to the irreducible complexity of human situations, a form of methodological pluralism *avant la lettre*.

Methodological Plurality in Practice

The methodological repertoire available to the *mujtahid* is extensive and reflects the tradition's recognition that no single instrument of reasoning suffices for the full range of legal problems that confront Muslim communities. The primary

¹⁸ S. Janah and R. Ummah, "Ijtihad: Sebuah Solusi Dalam Hukum Islam," *Al Manar* 2, no. 1 (2024): 142–152.

¹⁹ R. Rizani et al., "Istinbath Hukum Islam Masa Kenabian dan Sahabat: Sejarah, Karakteristik, dan Metode Ijtihad dalam Membentuk Hukum Islam," *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence, Economic and Legal Theory* 2, no. 2 (2024): 619–644.

²⁰ M. Taufiq, "Validitas Hadis Tentang Pengutusan Mu'adz ke Yaman," *Jurnal Al-Hurriyah* 11, no. 1 (2010).

²¹ E. Susilo, Y. Aziz, and S. A. Murtafi'ah, "Potret Penyelesaian Masalah Hukum Era Sahabat Melalui Ijtihad," *Nizham Journal of Islamic Studies* 11, no. 1 (2023): 40–52.

²² N. Nurlina, L. Sultan, and F. Hilal, "Pemikiran Hukum Islam pada Masa Tabi'in dan Tabi'ut Tabi'in serta Masa Taqlid," *Al-Rasikh: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 13, no. 1 (2024): 1–12.

²³ I. R. Suherli, H. Bisri, and N. R. Kusuma, "Stagnasi dan Kemunduran Ushul Fiqih: Faktor Penyebab, Peran Tokoh dan Upaya Pengembangan," *Equality: Journal of Islamic Law* 2, no. 1 (2024): 32–48.

methods include: *qiyas* (analogical reasoning), which establishes legal parity between an unregulated case and a regulated one on the basis of a shared operative cause ('*illah*); *istihsan* (juristic preference), which involves departing from the literal implication of analogy in favor of a ruling more consonant with equity and public welfare; *maslahah mursalah* (unrestricted public interest), which grounds legal determinations in the general welfare of the community even in the absence of specific textual warrant; and '*urf* (customary practice), which acknowledges the normative weight of established social conventions where these do not conflict with revealed principles.²⁴

These are not loosely applied heuristics but disciplined intellectual tools, each governed by its own conditions of applicability and normative constraints. Their diversity speaks to a fundamental insight embedded in the *ijtihad* tradition: that the law's encounter with reality cannot be reduced to a single operation without distorting either the complexity of revelation or the irreducible variety of human circumstances. Historical cases illustrate the boldness with which classical jurists deployed this pluralism. 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, to cite the most famous example, suspended the share of *zakat* allocated to recent converts (*mu'allafat al-qulub*) on the grounds that the political consolidation of Islam had rendered this particular incentive obsolete—a ruling that departed from the explicit Qur'anic text on the basis of a contextual reading of the *maqasid*.²⁵ Similarly, his suspension of the hadd penalty for theft during a period of famine reflected a contextually sensitive application of the principle that necessity transforms the conditions of legal obligation.²⁶

In the contemporary period, *ijtihad* has been invoked to address a wide range of issues that the classical jurists could not have anticipated: the ethics of organ transplantation, the jurisprudence of Islamic finance, the regulation of assisted reproductive technologies, and the governance of digital economies, among many others.²⁷ This ongoing extension of juridical reasoning into new domains testifies to the living character of *ijtihad* as an epistemological practice—and to the inadequacy of any approach that would confine Islamic law to the textual determinations of a pre-modern past. The institutional dimension of collective *ijtihad* (*ijtihad jama'i*), as exercised by bodies such as national fatwa councils and international fiqh academies, adds yet another layer to this picture of methodological richness.²⁸

²⁴ M. A. Alfatoni et al., "Sejarah Empat Mazhab Islam Dan Eksistensinya Di Indonesia," *Taruna Law: Journal of Law and Syariah* 2, no. 2 (2024): 138–150.

²⁵ F. M. Arif, *Perbandingan Mazhab dalam Lintasan Sejarah* (Makasar: Indonesia Independent Publisher, 2013).

²⁶ N. S. Nazela and N. A. Rahmi, "Pemikiran Mazhab Malikiyah: Sejarah, Pemikiran Dan Perkembangan Mazhab," *Islamic Education* 1, no. 1 (2023): 67–89.

²⁷ S. Janah and R. Ummah, "Ijtihad: Sebuah Solusi Dalam Hukum Islam," 142–152.

²⁸ S. Sa, "Ijtihad Terhadap Dalil Qath'i Dalam Kajian Hukum Islam," *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 1, no. 2 (2017): 479–490.

Revisiting Ijtihad from a Feyerabendian Perspective

Shared Opposition to Methodological Absolutism

The most fundamental point of convergence between Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and the Islamic tradition of *ijtihad* lies in their shared resistance to what might be called methodological imperialism—the imposition of a single epistemic framework as the exclusive condition of legitimate knowledge. Feyerabend's philosophical career was, in its deepest impulse, a sustained protest against the hegemony of any method that presents itself as the last word on how knowledge must be produced.²⁹ The *ijtihad* tradition, for its part, has always recognized that no single analytical procedure, not even the rigorously developed analogical reasoning of *qiyas*, can adequately handle the full range of situations that confront Muslim communities across history and geography.³⁰

The historical diversity of the juridical schools provides a concrete illustration of this structural affinity. The divergence between Abu Hanifah's rationalist orientation and Malik's traditionalist emphasis—between the primacy accorded to systemic reasoning in one school and the privileging of transmitted practice in another—is not an embarrassing inconsistency in the Islamic legal tradition but rather an expression of its epistemic maturity. Feyerabend would recognize in this divergence precisely the kind of methodological pluralism he championed: an acknowledgment that different contexts call for different cognitive approaches, and that the richness of our understanding of any domain is directly proportional to the variety of perspectives we bring to bear upon it.³¹

Responsible Freedom and the Critique of Epistemic Closure

The “anything goes” principle has suffered from persistent misreading, not least because its ironic register has too often been lost in translation. Feyerabend himself was at pains to clarify that this maxim was not an invitation to abandon all standards but rather a polemical device designed to expose the arbitrariness of methodological prescriptions that pretend to a universality they do not possess.³² What Feyerabend genuinely advocated was not chaos but intellectual liberty—the right of inquiry to follow its object wherever it leads, unhampered by a priori restrictions on the kinds of reasoning that may legitimately be employed.

This notion of responsible intellectual freedom finds a structural parallel in the *ijtihad* tradition, where the freedom of reasoned inquiry has never been understood as unrestricted. The *mujtahid*'s creative latitude operates within a normative framework defined by the incontrovertible (*qat'i*) rulings of Qur'an and *Sunnah*.

²⁹ A. Safri and S. Harahap, “Metode Ijtihad Imam Al-Syaukani,” *HUKUMAH: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 1, no. 2 (2020): 1–21.

³⁰ R. Rahmatullah, “Konseptualisasi dan Dinamika Ijtihad: Telaah atas Metodologi, Produk Hukum, dan Implikasinya terhadap Modernisasi Hukum Islam,” *Socius: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 3, no. 1 (2025).

³¹ F. Firdaus et al., “Various Methods of Establishing Contemporary Islamic Law,” *Ulumuddin: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 10, no. 1 (2020): 39–58.

³² F. Ardiansyah et al., “Ijtihad Hukum Umar Bin Khattab Dalam Perspektif Hukum Islam,” *Tabayyun: Journal of Islamic Studies* 2, no. 1 (2024).

Questions whose legal status has been definitively established by clear and unambiguous texts—the obligatory character of the five daily prayers, the prohibition of certain categories of conduct—lie beyond the scope of *ijtihad*. It is precisely within the vast domain of matters not thus settled that the *mujtahid* is both entitled and required to exercise independent legal reasoning, bringing the full resources of the available methodological repertoire to bear upon the particular problem.³³

What unites both traditions, then, is not identical content but a shared structural commitment: the conviction that knowledge grows through responsible exploration rather than through epistemic closure. Both Feyerabend and the classical jurists recognized that the premature foreclosure of inquiry—whether through methodological fiat or juridical rigidity—impoverishes understanding and ultimately does a disservice to the very truth it claims to protect. The methodological creativity that led Abu Hanifah to develop *istihsan* as a corrective supplement to *qiyas*, or that led Malik to treat the living consensus of Medina as a form of transmitted evidence, is the jurisprudential expression of the same epistemological instinct that led Feyerabend to champion the proliferation of scientific theories and methodological approaches.³⁴

Epistemic Pluralism and the Value of Disagreement

One of the most striking, and least appreciated, features of Feyerabend's philosophy is his valorization of intellectual disagreement as a cognitive resource. For Feyerabend, the diversity of competing theories and methodological approaches is not a regrettable imperfection in the epistemic landscape to be overcome through the eventual triumph of a single paradigm; it is, rather, a positive condition of intellectual progress.³⁵ The confrontation between competing approaches, each illuminating aspects of reality that others occlude, is what keeps inquiry genuinely open.

The Islamic jurisprudential tradition has articulated an analogous insight through the doctrine of *ikhtilaf* (scholarly disagreement), captured in the widely cited aphorism that the “differences of opinion among my community are a mercy.” This principle reflects an understanding that divergent legal rulings—where they result from genuine and methodologically disciplined engagement with the sources—are not a threat to the coherence of Islamic law but rather an expression of its capacity to accommodate the complexity of human situations. The productive disagreements between the classical schools of jurisprudence enriched the tradition in ways that any

³³ A. Sahidin, “Telaah Atas Ijtihad Umar Bin Khattab Perspektif Maqashid al-Syari’ah,” *Jurnal Penelitian Medan Agama* 14, no. 1 (2023): 25–34.

³⁴ A. Supriatna, “Perkembangan Fikih dalam Era Digital: Kajian terhadap Metode Ijtihad dalam Memahami Masalah Kontemporer,” *As-Syar’i: Jurnal Bimbingan & Konseling Keluarga* 6, no. 1 (2024): 717–734.

³⁵ I. La Harisi, D. Irawan, and M. W. Abdullah, “Renewal of Islamic Law: Comparative Study between Progressive Islamic Theory and Ijtihad Method,” *Al-Afkar, Journal for Islamic Studies* 7, no. 4 (2024): 732–747.

premature settlement of the debates would have foreclosed.³⁶ Feyerabend's celebration of methodological diversity thus resonates deeply with Islam's long-standing acknowledgment of interpretive multiplicity as a form of epistemic vitality rather than a symptom of institutional weakness.

Feyerabend's critique of methodological monoculture also has an important cross-cultural dimension. He argued that the hegemony of a single scientific method inevitably marginalizes epistemic contributions from non-Western traditions, including religious, cultural, and humanistic modes of knowledge.³⁷ The inclusion of *'urf* (established custom) as a legitimate source of law within Islamic jurisprudence, provided it does not contravene revealed principles, reflects a comparable recognition that knowledge of human affairs cannot be generated in abstraction from the concrete social contexts in which human life unfolds.³⁸ Both frameworks resist the reduction of epistemic authority to a single source or method; both insist that knowledge is produced through an ongoing dialogue between general principles and particular circumstances.

Critical Differentiation: Disciplined Pluralism vs. Radical Anarchism

The comparison developed above must not, however, be allowed to obscure a fundamental distinction. Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism is, in the end, a position of radical methodological liberty. It does not recognize any source of authority—whether empirical, rational, or revelatory—as placing genuine constraints on what counts as a legitimate intellectual move. The “anything goes” principle, interpreted at its most radical, admits no principled ground for excluding any approach from the domain of legitimate inquiry.³⁹

The *ijtihad* tradition operates from a fundamentally different metaphysical premise. For the Muslim jurist, the Qur'an and the prophetic *Sunnah* constitute not merely one epistemic framework among others but the final and authoritative word of God—a source of normative guidance that is not itself subject to the kind of revisionary scrutiny that Feyerabend would direct at any human methodological convention. Within the domain defined by incontrovertible textual determinations, the pluralism of *ijtihad* does not operate. The freedom of the *mujtahid* is a conditioned freedom, expansive within its domain but bounded by the givenness of revelation.⁴⁰

³⁶ M. Bahren and I. Mustofa, “Peran Ijtihad Jama'i dalam Pembaruan Pemahaman Al-Qur'an dan Hadis di Indonesia,” *Al-Akmal: Jurnal Studi Islam* 3, no. 6 (2024): 1–10.

³⁷ N. Mustakim, “Anarkis Epistemologis Paul Karl Feyerabend dan Relevansinya dalam Ilmu Keagamaan,” *AZKIA: Jurnal Aktualisasi Pendidikan Islam* 15, no. 2 (2020).

³⁸ R. L. Gaol, “Kebebasan yang Memerdekakan: Sumbangsih Pemikiran Filsafat Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul K. Feyerabend Terhadap Pemahaman Radikalisme Agama,” *Aradha: Journal of Divinity, Peace and Conflict Studies* 1, no. 2 (2021): 145–164.

³⁹ I. Farhan, “Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul Karl Feyerabend dan Relevansinya dalam Membentuk Pandangan Moderasi Beragama,” *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 20, no. 2 (2020): 109–130.

⁴⁰ A. W. N. Paraga et al., “Pemikiran Hukum Islam Salafi-Wahabi dalam Pandangan Ulama Fikih Empat Mazhab,” *El-Faqih: Jurnal Pemikiran Dan Hukum Islam* 10, no. 2 (2024): 275–300.

This distinction calls for a conceptual refinement. What the *ijtihad* tradition offers is not epistemological anarchism in Feyerabend's sense but rather what we might call *disciplined pluralism*—a methodological openness that is calibrated to context, constrained by normative principle, and animated by a sincere commitment to understanding the divine will. The parallel between the two traditions lies not in the identity of their foundational commitments but in the structural posture they adopt with respect to the question of methodological authority: both resist the absolutization of any single method; both insist that the search for knowledge must remain responsive to the particularity of its objects; and both recognize that intellectual progress requires the courage to think beyond inherited frameworks.⁴¹

Toward an Integrative Epistemological Framework

The productive encounter between Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and the Islamic tradition of *ijtihad* points toward the possibility of what might be called an *epistemological ijtihad*, a reflexive, methodologically pluralistic approach to Islamic knowledge production that draws on the resources of both traditions without capitulating to the limitations of either. Such a framework would retain the normative grounding in revelation that distinguishes Islamic epistemology from purely naturalistic approaches, while at the same time embracing the methodological creativity and contextual sensitivity that Feyerabend's thought encourages.⁴²

The construction of such a framework has several practical implications for contemporary Islamic scholarship. First, it implies a more receptive stance toward methodological innovation—a willingness to explore analytical tools developed outside the classical *usul al-fiqh* tradition (including insights from the social sciences, hermeneutical philosophy, and comparative law) as potential enrichments of, rather than threats to, Islamic epistemology.⁴³ Second, it implies a revitalization of the tradition of collective *ijtihad* as a deliberative institutional process in which diverse scholarly perspectives are brought into productive dialogue, a process closer in spirit to Feyerabend's vision of knowledge as a collaborative and contestatory enterprise than to the image of the solitary scholar deducing rulings from canonical texts.⁴⁴

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Feyerabendian lens invites Islamic scholarship to a greater degree of self-reflexivity, an ongoing interrogation of the assumptions and methods that govern its own knowledge production. This is not

⁴¹ R. A. Fitria et al., "Historisitas, Setting Sosial, Intelektual dan Produk Pemikiran Hukum Islam Madzhab Arba'ah," *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence, Economic and Legal Theory* 2, no. 2 (2024): 700–729.

⁴² M. Melati and H. Hamdanah, "Multikulturalisme: Memahami Keanekaragaman dalam Masyarakat Global dalam Perspektif Islam," *Innovative: Journal of Social Science Research* 4, no. 3 (2024): 1504–1515.

⁴³ F. B. Hardiman, *Kebenaran dan Para Kritikusnya: Mengulik Idea Besar yang Memandu Zaman Kita* (Yogyakarta: PT Kanisius, 2023).

⁴⁴ U. M. I. S. Anggraheni et al., "Liberalisme dalam Tubuh Pendidikan Islam: Melacak Akar Historis, Peranan, serta Dampaknya bagi Pendidikan," *Abdussalam: Jurnal Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Islam* 1, no. 2 (2025): 150–160.

relativism but intellectual honesty: the acknowledgment that even the most rigorous scholarly traditions are historically situated and therefore potentially subject to enrichment through encounter with other ways of knowing. The classical jurists who developed *ijtihad* as a methodological tradition were themselves engaged in precisely this kind of reflective self-criticism, and it is that spirit, rather than any specific set of conclusions, that the integration of Feyerabend's insights is most apt to revive.⁴⁵

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that Paul Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and the Islamic intellectual tradition of *ijtihad* share a deep, if not immediately obvious, philosophical kinship. Both are animated by a sustained opposition to methodological absolutism; both affirm the epistemic value of methodological diversity; and both insist that the genuine pursuit of knowledge requires a posture of intellectual openness that is responsive to the particularity of contexts rather than the authority of predetermined procedures. In Feyerabend's idiom, this insight is expressed through the provocative maxim "anything goes"; in the Islamic tradition, it is embodied in the centuries-long practice of contextually calibrated juridical reasoning.

At the same time, the study has been careful to identify the critical distinction that prevents this comparison from collapsing into simple equivalence. Feyerabend's anarchism is radical in its rejection of all methodological authority, including revealed authority. The *ijtihad* tradition, by contrast, operates within a normative horizon defined by divine revelation—a horizon that constitutes not a limitation on genuine knowledge but its ultimate orientation. What the tradition offers is disciplined pluralism rather than unlimited anarchism: a freedom of inquiry that is expansive precisely because it is grounded in the conviction that the world of human affairs is irreducibly complex and can only be approached with the full repertoire of available analytical resources.

The theoretical contribution of this study consists in the articulation of an integrative epistemological framework, what we have called *epistemological ijtihad*, that bridges Western philosophy of science and Islamic hermeneutical tradition. This framework does not advocate for the dissolution of Islamic epistemology into a generic philosophical pluralism but rather for its revitalization through a deeper engagement with the structural parallels and productive tensions that the encounter with Feyerabend's thought makes visible. If this study has succeeded in demonstrating the fertility of this encounter, it will have contributed, however modestly, to the project of developing a more dynamic, contextually sensitive, and intellectually generous paradigm for contemporary Islamic knowledge production.

Future research might profitably extend this dialogue in several directions: a closer examination of specific contemporary legal questions—in bioethics,

⁴⁵ M. Misran, "Al-Mashlahah Mursalah: Suatu Metodologi Alternatif dalam Menyelesaikan Persoalan Hukum Kontemporer," *Jurnal Justisia* 1, no. 1 (2016): 133–157.

environmental jurisprudence, or digital governance—through the integrative framework proposed here; a comparative analysis that brings additional Western philosophers of science (Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Bas van Fraassen) into dialogue with the *ijtihad* tradition; and an empirical investigation of how methodological pluralism functions in the actual deliberative practices of contemporary Islamic fatwa institutions. Each of these lines of inquiry would deepen our understanding of the epistemological resources available to Muslim scholars as they navigate the complex intellectual landscape of the twenty-first century.

References

- Afandhi, Y., and A. H. K. Jatmiko. “Tinjauan Yuridis Perbandingan Antara Hukum Positif dan Hukum Islam Terkait Penyalahgunaan Narkoba.” *Hukum Inovatif: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Sosial dan Humaniora* 1, no. 4 (2024): 134–146. <https://doi.org/10.62383/humif.v1i4.637>
- Ahmad, N. M., L. H. Sein, et al. “Pemikiran Paul K. Feyerabend Tentang Anarkis Epistemologi Dan Implikasinya Pada Studi Islam.” *Halaqah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2024): 109–127. <https://doi.org/10.62509/hjis.v1i1.114>
- Alfatoni, M. A., I. N. Wasih, M. H. Akbar, and N. O. N. Niba. “Sejarah Empat Mazhab Islam Dan Eksistensinya Di Indonesia.” *Taruna Law: Journal of Law and Syariah* 2, no. 2 (2024): 138–150. <https://doi.org/10.54298/tarunalaw.v2i02.196>
- Amalia Azahra, Fadhil Muhammad Dzaki, Robbi Hardiansyah Manik, Juanda Pramu Yudistira, Wismanto Wismanto, and Fitria Mayasari. “Peran Ijtihad dalam Menjawab Tantangan Hukum Islam di Era Modern.” *Journal of Student Research* 3, no. 5 (2025): 9–14. <https://doi.org/10.55606/jsr.v3i1.3476>
- Anggraheni, U. M. I. S., A. Nurhuda, A. L. I. A. S. Huda, D. S. R. I. Anugrah, and M. Al Fajri. “Liberalisme Dalam Tubuh Pendidikan Islam.” *Abdussalam: Jurnal Pendidikan Dan Kebudayaan Islam* 1, no. 2 (2025): 150–160.
- Ardiansyah, F., A. B. Pranata, D. S. Bahri, M. Einilia, and N. P. Dongoran. “Ijtihad Hukum Umar Bin Khattab Dalam Perspektif Hukum Islam.” *Tabayyun: Journal of Islamic Studies* 2, no. 1 (2024).
- Arif, F. M. *Perbandingan Mazhab dalam Lintasan Sejarah*. Makasar: Indonesia Independent Publisher, 2013.
- Bahren, M., and I. Mustofa. “Peran Ijtihad Jama’i dalam Pembaruan Pemahaman Al-Qur’an dan Hadis di Indonesia.” *Al-Akmal: Jurnal Studi Islam* 3, no. 6 (2024): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.47902/al-akmal.v3i6.342>
- Bahri, R. “Mengembangkan Kompetensi Abad 21 dalam Pendidikan Islam.” *Fakta: Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam* 3, no. 1 (2023): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.28944/fakta.v3i1.1190>
- Faradi, A. A., I. Tulungagung, J. Mayor, and S. Timur. *Dan Implikasinya Terhadap Pemikiran Islam*, 2010.
- Farhan, I. “Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul Karl Feyerabend dan Relevansinya dalam Membentuk Pandangan Moderasi Beragama.” *Analisis: Jurnal Studi*

- Keislaman* 20, no. 2 (2020): 109–130.
<https://doi.org/10.24042/ajsk.v20i2.7605>
- Fauzi, A. “Konsep Muallaf dalam Islam (Studi Kritis Terhadap Ijtihad Umar bin Khattab).” *Madania: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 11, no. 1 (2021): 29–39.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.24014/jiik.v11i1.13920>
- Feyerabend, Paul. *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*. London: New Left Books, 1975.
- Firdaus, F., A. Juneidi, L. Astari, and F. M. Sari. “Various Methods of Establishing Contemporary Islamic Law.” *Ulumuddin: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 10, no. 1 (2020): 39–58. <https://doi.org/10.47200/ulumuddin.v10i1.340>
- Fitria, R. A., J. Jalaluddin, F. Azhari, and F. Hamdi. “Historisitas, Setting Sosial, Intelektual dan Produk Pemikiran Hukum Islam Madzhab Arba’ah.” *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence, Economic and Legal Theory* 2, no. 2 (2024): 700–729. <https://doi.org/10.62976/ijjel.v2i2.547>
- Gaol, R. L. “Kebebasan yang Memerdekakan: Sumbangsih Pemikiran Filsafat Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul K. Feyerabend.” *Aradha: Journal of Divinity, Peace and Conflict Studies* 1, no. 2 (2021): 145–164.
<https://doi.org/10.21460/aradha.2021.12.703>
- Hardiman, F. B. *Kebenaran dan Para Kritikusnya*. Yogyakarta: PT Kanisius, 2023.
- Has, A. W. “Ijtihad Sebagai Alat Pemecahan Masalah Umat Islam.” *Epistemé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman* 8, no. 1 (2013): 89–112.
<https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2013.8.1.89-112>
- Herlina, R. “Ijtihad Dalam Mewujudkan Interpretasi Hukum Islam.” *Al-Astar* 4, no. 1 (2025): 68–80.
- Idris, M., F. A. Pratama, and L. M. Muthalib. “The Using of Maslahah Mursalah Method as Hujjah.” *Al-'Adl* 14, no. 2 (2021): 184–197.
<https://doi.org/10.31332/aladl.v14i2.2793>
- Iskandar, R. A., and S. Sauri. “Scientific Structure Revolution, Epistemological Anarchism, and the Research Program in the New Philosophy of Science.” *Al-Afkar Journal for Islamic Studies* 7, no. 2 (2024): 1–11.
<https://doi.org/10.31943/afkarjournal.v7i2.944>
- Janah, S., and R. Ummah. “Ijtihad: Sebuah Solusi Dalam Hukum Islam.” *Al Manar* 2, no. 1 (2024): 142–152.
- Kurdi. “Feyerabend Dalam Studi Ilmu Tafsir Al-Quran.” *Religia* 18, no. 1 (2015): 1–26.
- La Harisi, I., D. Irawan, and M. W. Abdullah. “Renewal of Islamic Law: Comparative Study between Progressive Islamic Theory and Ijtihad Method.” *Al-Afkar, Journal For Islamic Studies* 7, no. 4 (2024): 732–747.
<https://doi.org/10.31943/afkarjournal.v7i4.1672>
- Manik, R. H., F. M. Dzaki, A. Azzahra, J. P. Yudistira, W. Wismanto, and F. Mayasari. “Peran Ijtihad dalam Menjawab Tantangan Hukum Islam di Era Modern.” *Jurnal Kajian dan Penelitian Umum* 2, no. 6 (2024): 118–126.
<https://doi.org/10.47861/jkpu-nalanda.v2i6.1411>

- Melati, M., and H. Hamdanah. "Multikulturalisme: Memahami Keanekaragaman Dalam Masyarakat Global Dalam Perspektif Islam." *Innovative: Journal of Social Science Research* 4, no. 3 (2024): 1504–1515. <https://doi.org/10.31004/innovative.v4i3.10660>
- Misran, M. "Al-Mashlahah Mursalah: Suatu Metodologi Alternatif dalam Menyelesaikan Persoalan Hukum Kontemporer." *Jurnal Justisia* 1, no. 1 (2016): 133–157. <https://doi.org/10.22373/justisia.v1i1.2641>
- Muhyiddin, D. S., N. F. Natsir, and E. Haryanti. "Memahami Gagasan Anything Goes Paul Karl Feyerabend dan Implikasinya terhadap Pendidikan Islam." *JiIP – Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Pendidikan* 5, no. 1 (2022): 290–301. <https://doi.org/10.54371/jiip.v5i1.412>
- Musaddad, E. *Dinamika Ijtihad Ulama NU Dari Masa ke Masa*. Jakarta: Penerbit A-Empat, 2025.
- Mustakim, N. "Anarkis Epistemologis Paul Karl Feyerabend dan Relevansinya dalam Ilmu Keagamaan." *AZKIA: Jurnal Aktualisasi Pendidikan Islam* 15, no. 2 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.58645/jurnalazkia.v15i2.17>
- Nazela, N. S., and N. A. Rahmi. "Pemikiran Mazhab Malikiyah: Sejarah, Pemikiran Dan Perkembangan Mazhab." *Islamic Education* 1, no. 1 (2023): 67–89.
- Nurlina, N., L. Sultan, and F. Hilal. "Pemikiran Hukum Islam pada Masa Tabi'in dan Tabi'ut Tabi'in serta Masa Taqlid." *Al-Rasikh: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 13, no. 1 (2024): 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.38073/rasikh.v13i1.1669>
- Nurnazmi, N., H. S. S. A. Mahmoud, and M. Anas. "Anarkisme Epistemologis Paul Karl Feyerabend dalam Kajian Ilmu Pengetahuan." *Edu Sociata: Jurnal Pendidikan Sosiologi* 6, no. 1 (2023): 41–55. <https://doi.org/10.33627/es.v6i1.1110>
- Paraga, A. W. N., S. Paraga, D. D. Madina, and N. J. Majid. "Pemikiran Hukum Islam Salafi-Wahabi dalam Pandangan Ulama Fikih Empat Mazhab." *El-Faqih: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Hukum Islam* 10, no. 2 (2024): 275–300. <https://doi.org/10.58401/faqih.v10i2.1370>
- Putri, D. N. "Konsep Urf Sebagai Sumber Hukum Dalam Islam." *El-Mashlahah* 10, no. 2 (2020): 14–25. <https://doi.org/10.23971/maslahah.v10i2.1911>
- Rahmatullah, R. "Konseptualisasi dan Dinamika Ijtihad." *Socius: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 3, no. 1 (2025). <https://ojs.daarulhuda.or.id/index.php/Socius/article/view/2071>
- Rizani, R., J. Jalaluddin, F. Azhari, and F. Hamdi. "Istinbath Hukum Islam Masa Kenabian dan Sahabat." *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Jurisprudence, Economic and Legal Theory* 2, no. 2 (2024): 619–644. <https://doi.org/10.62976/ijjel.v2i2.540>
- Sa, S. "Ijtihad Terhadap Dalil Qath'i Dalam Kajian Hukum Islam." *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 1, no. 2 (2017): 479–490. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjkh.v1i2.2379>
- Safri, A., and S. Harahap. "Metode Ijtihad Imam Al-Syaukani." *HUKUMAH: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 1, no. 2 (2020): 1–21.

- Sahidin, A. “Telaah Atas Ijtihad Umar Bin Khattab Perspektif Maqashid al-Syari’ah.” *Jurnal Penelitian Medan Agama* 14, no. 1 (2023): 25–34. <http://dx.doi.org/10.58836/jpma.v14i1.16553>
- Sapriadi, S., D. Darliana, J. Mudjrimin, A. Alauddin, and E. Eril. “Perkembangan Ijtihad pada Masa Modern di Indonesia.” *Jurnal Al-Ahkam: Jurnal Hukum Pidana Islam* 7, no. 1 (2025): 124–135. <https://doi.org/10.47435/al-ahkam.v7i1.3644>
- Sarmiji. “Peranan Epistemologi dalam Membangun Hukum Islam.” *Journal of Islamic and Law Studies* 4, no. 1 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.18592/jils.v4i1.3781>
- Suaib, S., R. Riswan, and H. Hasnawati. “Dinamika Ijtihad Dalam Menjawab Tantangan Kontemporer Hukum Islam.” *Jurnal Intelek Insan Cendikia* 2, no. 3 (2025): 4405–4414.
- Suherli, I. R., H. Bisri, and N. R. Kusuma. “Stagnasi dan Kemunduran Ushul Fiqih: Faktor Penyebab, Peran Tokoh dan Upaya Pengembangan.” *Equality: Journal of Islamic Law* 2, no. 1 (2024): 32–48. <https://doi.org/10.15575/ejil.v2i1.732>
- Supriatna, A. “Perkembangan Fikih dalam Era Digital.” *As-Syar’i: Jurnal Bimbingan & Konseling Keluarga* 6, no. 1 (2024): 717–734. <https://doi.org/10.47467/as.v6i1.5478>
- Susilo, E., Y. Aziz, and S. A. Murtafi’ah. “Potret Penyelesaian Masalah Hukum Era Sahabat Melalui Ijtihad.” *Nizham Journal of Islamic Studies* 11, no. 1 (2023): 40–52. <https://doi.org/10.32332/nizham.v11i01.6951>
- Tahir, M. “Kontribusi Pemikiran Filsafat Anarkisme Epistemologi Paul K. Feyerabend Terhadap Studi Islam.” *Lentera* 18, no. 2 (2016): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.21093/lj.v18i2.760>
- Tanuri, T. “Epistemologi Hukum Islam dalam Hukum Positif di Indonesia.” *Al-Mashlahah Jurnal Hukum Islam dan Pranata Sosial* 12, no. 1 (2024). <https://doi.org/10.30868/am.v12i01.5611>
- Taufiq, M. “Validitas Hadis Tentang Pengutusan Mu’adz ke Yaman.” *Jurnal Al-Hurriyah* 11, no. 1 (2010). <https://doi.org/10.30983/alhurriyah.v11i1.391>
- Tirta, T. A. W. D. “Antara Tradisionalitas Dan Modernitas: Membangun Paradigma Kemajuan Umat Islam Melalui Integrasi Epistemologi Barat Dan Islam.” *Mazalat: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 6, no. 1 (2024): 78–89. <https://doi.org/10.64367/m-jpi.v6i1.16>
- Wahyudi, M. A., S. Rijal, Silahuddin, and M. Ikhwan. “Implikasi Epistemologis Pemikiran Filsafat Paul Karl Feyerabend.” *Academic Journal of Islamic Principles and Philosophy* 4, no. 1 (2023): 135–154. <https://doi.org/10.22515/ajipp.v4i1.6676>
- Wahyudi, M. N. “Epistemologi Islam di Era Modern: Studi Feyerabend tentang Anarkisme Epistemologi.” *Almahra: Jurnal Studi Islam* 2, no. 2 (2021): 134–148. <https://doi.org/10.30595/ajsi.v2i2.11791>
- Widiawati, N. *Pluralisme Metodologi: Diskursus Sains, Filsafat, dan Tasawuf*. Bandung: Edu Publisher, 2020.

Zulhendra, J. “Fresh Ijtihad sebagai Upaya dalam Meretas Tertutupnya Pintu Ijtihad.” *Al-Qanun: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pembaharuan Hukum Islam* 26, no. 1 (2023): 83–95. <https://doi.org/10.15642/alqanun.2023.26.1.83-95>